Quark Rules

New Quark Rules For DroidKungFu

New Quark rules (#00212 - #00233) are now available. These rules target DroidKungFu, a malware family that gains unlimited access to a device, installs and uninstalls Apps, and forwards confidential data. Check here for the rule details.

With these rules, Quark is now able to identify the DroidKungFu malware family as high-risk. In our experiment, Quark achieved 100% accuracy and 100% precision. Check here for the APKs we tested.

Below is a summary report of a DroidKungFu sample (D277C97B1A8A78F859672B4A20E74B3313E9F964E68A6E857C1E9D33763434A5). The report shows that Quark identified the sample as high-risk and provided a list of the sample’s behaviors.

https://cdn.imgpile.com/f/dna1NWm_xl.png

Identified Well-Known Threats

With Quark’s rule classification feature, analysts can generate behavior maps and see how behaviors are related. This feature helps identify 3 well-known threats from DroidKungFu, as shown below.

1. Gain unlimited access to a device

https://cdn.imgpile.com/f/4nCi9mL_xl.png

The diagram shows that the Lcom/google/update/UpdateService;getPermission2 function runs shell scripts and Linux commands directly, and also calls the Lcom/google/update/Utils;oldrun function to execute additional commands.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Run shell script (#00069)

  • Execute Linux commands (#00068, #00155)

2. Install/Uninstall additional apps

https://cdn.imgpile.com/f/jpAr3Tm_xl.png

The diagram shows that the Lcom/waps/k;a function installs APKs from a file, and calls the Lcom/waps/l;a function to install more APKs and the Lcom/waps/k;b function to connect to a URL.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Install other APKs from file (#00054)

  • Connect to a URL and set request method (#00096)

3. Forward confidential data

https://cdn.imgpile.com/f/TsURgyN_xl.png

The diagram shows that the Lcom/madhouse/android/ads/_;_ function queries confidential data such as SMS and call logs and also calls the Lcom/madhouse/android/ads/_;__ function to check for network connectivity.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Query confidential data (#00077, #00219, #00221)

  • Check for network connectivity (#00224, #00226)

List of Tested APKs

The table below lists the APKs we tested.

in dex

sha256

1

27 A63D6412B3459E821D88A8EF133727B8DDA99262CEC71C9989EC28E394F173

2

C3 B0FF9C168FCDB02573AF741FC1E9B9E3EEA993A5407CFCF0BB29E0800760BE

3

E1 0A9E9A5758F04975FFE930AF08A339B897FF72DF85BE1707184C697C0E954F

4

2C 6B542B30C644BE1840E38EB8ED4592B671E4734C08FE57B315B92299B23A4A

5

1E C91FF1EA8ACCBC4181F3DF94C6A285013EC7A7D60467DEB9250E7681F4B73C

6

20 639CFB1369F3D490ED532FE30E294ED4058B7D67C426484D7028B7B2B165E5

7

5F 7A40015A1F3F42802424EC776799F5E0960F19E9BF8C86298AA5CFAC116BF6

8

E2 BC4E09BA57740C17F033F6B116EC0316771EF8C1DCB99145EEAC17F15FF2FA

9

7F 027D19AD8FCD2F4C6A6C74742DED6D1D7758FCD72BDD8B5590053BE65A1D2D

10

21 D4EB1ADA6CA0925AB8E21D30BFF8A40E88BC60773700B003C048BF8619E75E

11

73 A27FCF9FDE6D7EBC39F4995BD7DAA4F433C37314C0016D75C50CC39AE7A785

12

4E A68DEB209A29ED0B1FA7F7555006DEC050D8F77CF5820B550E32E5A6F6F88C

13

E6 440A1AB96884C44250F2DB53618FC6762DD13EEBC59D1095F1E188D40C68E4

14

C1 7D0979882468CCC26FDE81F5C6F0DDFB602F9AB9D3C92AC355C8D87A585380

15

47 7C68553FF88F831026E8842FE99FE14B2DDF08821A0CA3072B7EDBC872A292

16

B4 098AE6205E3808A6B79495B2027452A7B8191200402F8BA32DBA0EAB21EA99

17

39 3456E6368079F36DC0CEA861361F976A5CD6A3191B69E49CFD6BF4692DC57E

18

16 A0C217F26C948D683B515CBB9E06CC0AAC422A951CE9E9E532D7A571152D2F

19

D2 77C97B1A8A78F859672B4A20E74B3313E9F964E68A6E857C1E9D33763434A5

20

51 BFB82709E927D65770E5C59AB6EB96B73B19525E127F60A25831CD2B8AEE82

21

C0 8539123E1F40439E0DB7DDEEDD6BF6B079AB5E62B2208E22884B28306C1CCA

22

15 D1FDC4B27509DF6D31F851675D03A21939A165B2011BFE0DB5EEA69BBB6B3D

23

94 BC85F5458E313AA138C9F4E4B8ED3AB8642694A07427B80441B8A538EC462C

24

41 DD548C530516448CB6A28DA67407725163F9620D92A35F8735FA4135ECC0A2

25

A8 7C8FE4D821CB2B15FB4E1ADDF63E88DE7D09D37178A910C9221EA979C16F81

26

3B 736A91DCA7AE8608C2174AD589400D3FD5FAE55A395920841A49EB10657A37

27

80 0A8CFF0C559C9478E6941B5E0B30E3848E8A0F9246C8E0C1A34A1459288D68

28

BE DF51A5732D94C173BCD8ED918333954F5A78307C2A2F064B97B43278330F54

29

E2 0D4994C8A13854CD835919F5620A9B6217AC444016F9E97C3E9C3464E2F5CB

30

AB 0A824F00E4AEE68A17DAD86182B6FFE83D6D7D07D572D31183CF4A8C1723DA

31

AE BB5050F17588F0D3936B1B13BF7DCD856A7ACD8DB107C4853E7A9058D2A0CA

32

AF 33315DFBF3ED5A0D28E8ED03A79D20C3B77B16129CCA9439BB4CBDDCA076E2

33

0A E6CECB96E4515F4536EFC711D583A447FFFDF2BCD4E04D2F4A0347F63E40EA

34

3C 81C9DF7CE0F94918CD0B833B070DFBBCEACF8688824AFBC6344E975EDFEB24

35

C5 C508FD88D058F5E2B3ABC2A066C52C1FAFB148F27000C47DA859945F771512

36

FE 98A9B6D1ACF4E2B52CAF0015E90B9FAB856B0C0AA581D526F3D2951B2F7904

37

BA 949E090EAB02005F9B1823B59AA4329017EA2441E81734F4827B3822C9704E

38

B6 BF9FACFA89990ADF7F01D561875AC54D7577CA351D0C23D69B5E83E376963E

39

2A 93EB58C737572DD375A36F8A5397140C815DCAE05DC80DAFAAD4B3981A91B6

40

D2 E2396D8F6052E551E84CC69A97DB7D3D08DF9B3AA40C0070A7CE96B33622C8

41

25 BE589140F73949124F08759AB5BB57B126396F1401E3BFBFDC5E5C056E0D03

42

41 BD9843692B7421B2FBCEAC3C2F6AF3CE9C92339C10D43898E7E072B8E28BE3

43

3A C65392A5E371D1FF5C7A2CBF580A4F3C2A5B36E11C01601D6B38D715C2A74B

44

5D 3A915B34D0925B9EA4A7E33E8E70A428B22CE57CD17CFB20DF37F463502B82

45

94 A96E66ABC0ACEF751AF0C2140AE7CAD05E434609EB56FE6A6E6602FFE3E4B9

46

67 E794151DD32338E0B1935A77ACA5B9A8D87C12C7A088326C2E9F2FFF048279

47

40 BA6610360FFFE5BAFEE8504751C78B5AF3B913DA1C2D4AE97AEEA156E5510B

48

19 7041741B0DD2FACE3C01A2FE82AC697A6B6B801B7DC2D3579DA7BBF56ACD73

49

8C 5130774E5F1E8F6A0A16281A5AF22C5AC1FCD46DE907667714760ECB76F7EC

50

86 FDE6F59EF9A8F762AF7BB62DFC4467CA9BD3ACC63E50E5AB78A7B4487ED70D

51

0B 33469936791DB785E8546BB752AA75DE4C3227293A4237249DBD05FC12D039

52

25 061C50965D05E98E409E3A07FE4CE4825A9DACFF46A79FE57EDA7BFD184DEA

53

D2 187491BAD25E07B6817CDD3F044466B8FE2BE63D255DA2FE7CA58E8C8C6321

54

44 6A635890947E7956D5E8DD10C758A733144D573528153D6F5AFD0DD038BFC4

55

DB 104CAC9471650E5E5AF54E14C80F6247E16923E78E41DFAEED42F28CF5C523

56

42 69E9F03F43D82DF992B417E961554CAECB80D06CA3B0C1B847A09FD257901F

57

C3 1BC398066441E6FDB5F98EE6A4529D6F51925F4951EA679C028E50D0CAD950

58

EC 6212709ED75DEFC848626D2888B685AEAFC4FFD655AD830557F9994E8995F3

59

66 BB9310F7063CC3B12F803D2C809C1DB46AB29F229599BE81728C432C208C9F

60

BA A24D27A78F0641ACF806BD03722AA47F1DCBC42F1CCA04B14B0118E398F94A

61

AC 5E59080E8E951AA5C62038D606E2BD3F8A20C0552F8E1B326B407D4BDCAA15

62

82 3EE1A0F81C0067F804B3F2497E8268A677C76D90DDD261A910CFE8D116897D

63

F3 F52121296119FF32C334075EA80B74495FDE648A7204BED66268B285FBF199

64

0D 9CB8010681D5F35969FB84F96FFCC53DD0B37AEE62F522C2972BEBF2759F02

65

03 259A1228E3AD616F10C2370B8C142A8D20132505FBC5CDB5137322A8A03FC6

66

8C B684F1C8FDA8D16E9399F9B75AE1972888BA4398EEE1A7BAAB311DAEAD5F0E

67

27 B02028221B1AE647BD749EF916AC4D0AD39BA3C961ECD1AE37DF7988488225

68

56 628C603FDB1F33FDB8E53D796919F5385A9BAC31E3217A20F2E7531543CBD2

69

00 621E015191863041E78726B863B7E1374B17FDA690367878D1272B0E44B232

70

4D 62CFEE89DFC4451BDA6FC9E6C09189B6BAD089E2E97E36084FD0E910363D76

71

04 9D5D5E6DDA98F512E0A9FD2D8E3299BB16ADFB63D95033ED6A839588D14425

72

64 AB7A8E612D8D60C1C4CC8CE1B4ACE4AAFCEC7E1F5239894F2B214B094FA1B1

73

3E 38E7FF5776548DA0FA1AFF91B364B338D5D7D51E6CB4E3ABFE2FF4B9BF985A

74

3E BB4C2BC959080EB9BA2328D10610B59E77892667F8CC5794479F0625E283EC

75

4D C7570244C38A690BCA52A8DA1B9108C7A0EE214FBC0A972725D43C8C78FA9A

76

EB 2F047FE3AEA452F1867EC57FAE2E4E853652FE9CBABDD995A11C6FEC0D6500

77

1B 7F0C198CB2278218B177F79F16D8C8CE9D7E46E2E65D2B6ACD61A3BA8C455A

78

8E 6DFA5676DAD428FD3BB767D33B74920D4B3E5D51821A1501D0ADC35B834A50

79

24 CCB1BF995EEE442CC4BB86828795BEB0043CA5BF694B3765FBBDA7F69F4E40

80

E7 0FB0052314184463A9F7D194DEE438FA381C6584B8009F178785E0E8CC5D66

81

BA F7340F3F1FD943A0A0E79FF59CAD5362D1BA45F05EB172A6730455F8CD55FA

82

CD 3AF68A6C2D93D0261962F50F8DBBB9D72BF952A88414B33DDA49C613DBD8B5

83

BA 14BC0202CF321F4368E0DEE08E67CC7B55AC3A03AAF1726E03C4CC0AB44F02

84

05 C68734C04460DFF87618C0065457788EDCAD84C23F32113B156A963290D917

85

09 B952BB0E499EA71E042F6984E6E7632FE1B2F646E212E16468B54A7D0E4253

86

70 3B9C40116A1AF70522933D25B72E85863EF177F937B28CE82C048928C83379

87

97 CE153A87917E46907CE3C43328FA398BADA713ADF9DF7A756174EE8C7F50E5

88

A5 706AD49019EF9671242437834A492170F6DDBBD11DF2BE8D0C7F0477530CBE

89

4F FF4F4F98197ACD4A943ACEDE362D4C64F9D20EE5E64F7D0F4E66F3DD08FBBC

90

54 F84DBB2A95A53AF72E7346CBE139BDEA1759C92C50AD202B66E8F6D548D876

91

93 BC7CAE3DC7ECAFB01A9D136A7D24E280673F7DDE1B30F545E1FE2646E8A66C

92

66 ACC04320B125B0974DF859850C1A5B2B9C2B58768CBAB83A93BA955FA9287F

93

C5 EA7E9101DCE70C56A0F48B622FCFF619D615F5034B15D21BDB7F40B74602CF

94

14 F44E244274BF9A698960DAA82D98D3FD66AC7E8FE6F7F9916F164E468C30A7

95

0F 2931043C240C14DE48C7A6630752474C3FE5A87A5113F13851CFE8D14754DC

96

1C 5A89EB4638229DD8DC6D4F55BCAC8D565D2FEF20F6BEFE52270D50973B6151

97

A1 F98073B0D39B6E3A981D7DB2C528CC9B88A4CC207350F4467916F265D0244F

98

A1 28DE003C61B08C439F181253A5C8882DE1C48F517B0B0BF6B18614D11E2674

99

D6 95B7310BED20E3AE00C0C4754039C3BB095062F4D746897BDF417444F454C9

100

F5 2BD07D3457B69720C9A54BE5730545BFCC80269BE749FACA723906A303AD33

101

B4 524506739CBF40D3C823D716FA2DEB9ACE38C199CF0F7661FE8DDF688953E6

102

43 567A80FB8122F77E1CF72CFD898A6B9BFDC18F27EBE716C444143E03630200

103

22 20A2EBB3068D1C912189CA6F8E89D0E63836E40A75F5E5C2B7B99A498E7CBA

104

E5 8BF56343D6A44B0D863534426109B348673C76EC433BF310E638F34EB786B7

105

30 866091584856AC8A7F353172C3D9B0643602F351BE56BA92B4AB2DFD68230D

106

1E 1D93EDC231E7F2FAE9ABB825640E803137A1A672B9D5E93BDFA6D7E8F57DCE

107

3D 210599B3EE6C84D9D8FCB236C02394D24974EE3E0FE2D03B013D538E611CE1

108

51 07DEDE507180C8458C4E5F87E27F580521F365A54D9E71286ACF0E54DB9E1E

109

5D 5624B266E294C0DC7673D2FB8E126EC559D37CEC74C5508D8E6674377EF107

110

DA 2EE0B84AC470986543ACCA1F4C51DEF534D23F04E39F0DD85CCCBA45232738

111

72 865ADB5BAFDA646F6F60834E0462E1626C88F075E4161F3CE0EBF217D6C4CB

112

8E A992D99898B26E014F82C475F605D90BF0828CFE244922197020B62147B55C

113

45 36BF0914B3D76047AEB6EA92F21D0CB7561F68DAE870DB3F6DE9FD7420B785

114

CA 8EB1155C2F5B33822B906F2255CDEAC0EEAD86A58F151C11BD5003458CFCA1

115

00 1E0F67B5BB9DDAB14FACBEF94791EAED0EB939BCB651D19DAFD0E2A05D8178

116

37 C1F16781B2399019AAF2525834ADFE00592F1C62D07D1B0C91A40E11D1B80C

117

F1 57946D3868FBE013EC23B14F1097BB727654B4F3926322F035E86E3F5F637E

118

E9 484114F77952ECE8234927BCC865886938C41F4F4657741F01B22A214E10FA

119

B0 CCDE6A945212ED23F3E85CD861D73A42A98C53D63237CD3C0EB67DDA57BDBC

120

C9 07757169BBE2A5FA05080B75E5E273F0EF02B06552BF4DF3C386096FEFDD20

121

0F A18A95361BBF4413A9B734B540F52C6BD2411090DEC4D7E3DB6708FEDC68AE

122

6E D52331A788EF18727C8E34746B59DB81ACDB261659934BE63B0266FB7C19E7

123

BC E128DBE9A75CCADE50ECAD2E52499F67E58479ECD69861B3D117984DF47136

124

AB 4B4D65A4C7CB3AAFBB7E6630830393D43E619881DA76EE06760466FB79E894

125

87 7BBED1EC7BA716D70754F6F015C950217FA16F6EA70833B0196C7C560B8239

126

00 15AE7C27688D45F79170DCEA16131CE557912A1A0C5F3B6B0465EE0774A452

127

B2 4B268C7C9574BB5FFA48C239F77089BD14BA3EA8B6DDE3DA42958569477D01

128

38 070B4D027E0256E6B8538384E374E14D7F8006920A60E9BB9238CD45855CC6

129

7B 5338E1E7BF8B4816B821DB9ED042ED13CE4F8EBD1748BA9788B070E45BF03D

130

4F 1CBB091DCDE0CD0E8FE0D4BD27134750BAC6711029E0A37179832AD3698EA9

131

E2 6656A75FB347F317ACC7A670F8D16DD4C4433691443A77B46C84B9E3A0FB66

132

B9 0564F3809FC8B0B0CE1CBC53DBFF6C6A293BCFCC5EF7821E28BF87262FB9FD

133

EE 21782BF346B26411CB00CA83F91AA18C01CF67086D500E66672A0DE046FFAD

134

24 2A0048497BCBDEB4D1A5A43DF08E492BFD42B0B85FF63B2C2A49AD5EA50829

135

53 702B51E102AC3AD7C859019B8640B88D65B3D6008825ACA2D1FCB80B2FA845

136

FA E5B82A8DDD7C6EA2B417711E7D0FF8EE02244B7FF9980BCDADFB940EC85096

137

0F CE8643A036D954E75ECA205B2EBA45629C999AA13ABF8896B4BBC07B0BCFA7

138

D3 4E040FD052963C9348B8AF50B415419216BE1A00DBF25C7F7B86545EF84C7C

139

9C 6724919CAF4DC134AACF828A62663084DDCD6459FD1249DF36BCFFC7EF2EBB

140

91 84D161D1931A58CFA091569CDE481FCC87AA3A4D32C24622A29EAEA5FC3EEE

141

C9 2E7ABD460FF39CB41709416959366739B08006DC2EEA05E367981F9578E6B0

142

B3 27C0BBB16C9ADCD566877AC29DC0B0EDCFF9E654DAD66C514B19877A45B6C8

143

62 923018BFCFB2AD1F05EDE135024EDBBADB20DFF9F816EC3F846B2900636ACF

144

2B AF6E70672789096752383F0DFDA9774A3FEF55CD64C5AD7FE5CE02F4BEB8FB

145

72 E6AE9CD081F8D38488CF4077F66DB0F97CEF486A60EB38C593BA82DB77ECD8

146

F6 EB0EB6FDBB4A1615050F59EB6FAE8F999824E5D65CE1A437761FE7BE4B8215

147

F7 B038B441E051B3BCC6F40964C215F61A3A226EF3A1B8D58A36E135115DBCFE

148

73 5F5724975302D23C7CCB6F69C0AB4C64F3E63AF38E828E302DCE79FB08593A

149

80 612FE193401626268553C54A865E67B76311E782005EDE2BA7A87A5D637420

150

93 8EFB5BDC96D353B28AF57DA2021B6A3C5A64452067059BF50D7FB7C7A66426

151

84 C7A452E72ABC4EAA51AD8F3569A6E10365804A963FA61C034FD1F3DC846957

152

07 FEAA0E04E56CB3CCD06FD7902A9D9CEC48DFD901BD6D5E07ADE81448DCC5D6

153

64 47ED2ABE5AB3827C519BC1EB732159FFE284BE73B8780F294F562996DC9C47

154

51 37EDD9FA6E73BE3B5C14C50FAF0B6602C7A155E30A931D2A98B31AC1E021C9

155

53 B1523A8F52D3C924043B93AC44FB96F2D496D1C054D873E62B5BC9644B1B52

156

D7 D47ABC80CDBC7D0AEDF9B8E863E28F0B79CA47D71155A3D364EF096DF98D7E

157

AC 48E0526730A611D363AE5DBFD2F3AA4296BD71C66E13B9DB3D272B754EDCD9

158

42 2B2A9F8547E4239E1BB508359872C6365B42ECC460C82A0FABAC04F2E44808

159

7D 4FD317B9E19AF2BBC5B707C3CCCA5D504B11371D10E3CBAF0AB4E56D0ACAB0

160

D5 C60074995C0AA0842AEF02269C8567F8B59902E4AADB865C69CB3738D9051F

161

C8 B6CC0BA9DDD2206FD35AA3AD379B169DEBFE223A0EE0E5AA28DA1AA683343C

162

92 1F76D6153E86E480A1FE309A19DA4F75B85BC3F85F3826694977CD2046F0A3

163

C7 C46F7E5F58B1E6912BC0638475840741CAED5685AF0AB6B563A637B92D41A3

164

37 D382FAAFCAAD6F8BF5DA383CB8703B7094A045AEAC5E13B5F4225C6272A615

165

65 CEFD92274FB4AF9F33728F8759A6BE835C7550B96EDAB798787CBB8EC95FB3

166

28 7E705784FE12335E9355C20F8BC8072A7A6A87DEA751CE471CCE37D426E9F0

167

AE F39A6FAEB83695C7D97B93E6BC550D0AED93EFE886E651A1610DD8B2ED013A

168

CB D9BA3E8D82F9D475C81BC3C057C19869810B2CD47E6EDBF392B4A7612F8239

169

51 F16E4D41EC420E8520220D44B0088C81619014896BE524F411B718E730A33F

170

CF 997FE5C0AB00EA447EE13F7DEEC8E97EFE412F65355448F04565A1F7AC0E72

171

E4 EB02B2D64D33E4C0536406BFC9A6D8FCC6B5237642D92333EE3E089BD82723

172

5B 8D52ABE9FA8E849A89CF87F90CB07E77BB429E0FE5F518873C8B26EE231A87

173

C9 6029C4F9777C9D521249EE1AC27F75C2350614C361469D0C7B3F8124DA3E14

174

A0 E3891E0790A9EC38EA05BCC0EA7067E98CED68DBCAFEE10A5F73D560A97B17

175

FD ED1EC2D17F957B230FEB5FFF518EC98322A1617E4E28953FF38270CB16098A

176

EB E06DFB790CCEC41432637C593139E6C813AF0BA0F1366FF9FF12F8DD89AD40

177

2D 2C183A82B5F13E458946DEFA3D2DC361B6FBB1321FE0535DAB40FCA4B7C272

178

A6 291A63E3B4E8E3B58E96DB2A98BA918E674B21B3483EC0A69DA5C5594390D8

179

C7 BE73CAC9A130F487490E98B811F707492F92EEB989D75681F113FC7B184F95

180

35 CEFBC2F7DB302E881DAEBB572093D721E3E94CDDEC465B6F08877095B572BD

181

6E 417844E162251228B6305C70ACC481F423036C6F14DA753F8C591F115EA8E0

182

58 96A3D47B5CEEAAD8C69D9811C79438233EF78E042EBEEFF807C69B6EE63FB2

183

3A 867B8D991A3125CA3ED27E2F0D6568277AEC1CD15A0D8F9201981F4A5EEC6D

184

D0 F06064FD7C105AFB139A30010104E1FE4A41A0967E450F9509ED7AA793AA1A

185

F1 9B3B007B54813C8395F826D76ABB6C7573286D9866ECF1F71CBBB75C12BF04

186

EF 2B268D4FF17708D1D01E363CB486E7AA83616AB595434535CFB33BE0F716C4

187

E1 16D6C8F922AE101D2AF721AF3D183DD12D47A167312266E54C02F8B5AE53E3

188

C7 EE00F75D464EFE63FBF3998517B171AA296DBD3254E95DF25BC579F8517AA2

189

4D 920F5202A33EBD9BBAFD73E11D5D222D4B8E0D50C11BC9B8B5F4E291F7C8E1

190

02 E112947AA19A577FD9D825531BD74797BBF5825A74E9918D4027BBD24BB49B

191

9A C9E6123537F163E7730768B1B39BDA34A7831B5A3F8752D2A0CA4C394F5752

192

2D 1EEE053F84BFFF1C9F4F82CAD96DD60D04596236DF9B929A921E32BF4EFB0A

193

31 4BA33232F07D0EAE2648A6DF5B3009484CFDBDA6E57D8A0B221D215EC5300F

New Quark Rules For GoldDream

New Quark rules (#00234 - #00237) are now available. These rules target GoldDream, a malware family that monitors SMS messages and phone calls and uploads them to remote servers. Check here for the rule details.

With these rules, Quark is now able to identify the GoldDream malware family as high-risk. In our experiment, Quark achieved 100% accuracy and 100% precision. Please check here for the APKs we tested.

Below is a summary report of a GoldDream sample (ECA3A3666B0FD72028431431E7FAE6774A8CA692E35AE3CB44FD8F2AA418F746). The report shows that Quark identified the sample as high-risk, with a list of behaviors as evidence.

https://cdn.imgpile.com/f/qg9XDXG_xl.png

Identified Well-Known Threats

With Quark’s rule classification feature, analysts can generate behavior maps and see how behaviors are related. This feature helps identify 2 well-known threats from GoldDream, as shown below.

1. Monitor SMS messages and phone calls

https://cdn.imgpile.com/f/egCf5BD_xl.png

The behavior map shows that the Lcom/sjhi/client/zjReceiver;onReceive function monitors SMS messages and phone call activity. It also calls the Lcom/sjhi/client/zjReceiver;a function to collect the data into files.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Monitor incoming call status (#00064)

  • Monitor incoming SMS message (#00234)

  • Monitor outgoing phone call (#00235)

  • Write data to file (#00236)

2. Upload SMS messages and phone calls to remote servers

https://cdn.imgpile.com/f/SOrA9Qz_xl.png

The behavior map shows that the Lcom/sjhi/client/e;a function connects to a URL and writes a file to an output stream. If the output stream is from the URL, this indicates the function uploads a file to a remote server.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Connect to a URL and set request method (#00096)

  • Write file content to an output stream (#00237)

List of Tested APKs

The table below lists the APKs we tested.

index

sha256

1

DAAFD978B9C3D6CE45DF705F9C5DE432609546673441A7F1ECAE7C4F42069FE1

2

D710998CC0C38046D8C3713463B992B925A647780D61030462DBEE41094D2E21

3

C2236E4159E14623214C9F22EB8B373AE47C20CEF126398B7EC2D11DDF7133CB

4

30838B9223D7C9A029D25903030C0EE5784E2556F3FB4994A9A66D0E52452915

5

F44FF1D306731B7EA378569545963A71254145252C2D26CA6F679CAA8FD39468

6

26C12F1A899DBA752B29B20B599CEAC2A814BE1AB3CD50BEB96A26B6033F2F1E

7

38A90E9AB4FAA62EA71F1FC726BA4B747FA363D9F4D15E7478239E771FC36BC9

8

72A3B68C5EBD84E1F9FF9AF529A2102A1DE08E7F1CA5B874CF1FFB4B380AF7C9

9

594EBCC14A163B86222BD09ADFE95498DA81CEAEB772B706339D0A24858B1267

10

4DB9936E2BD190CC35710264179D5FEB28735C0661991593F28D5FEA6B2A3998

11

021B664D927EE81E90B936E6B880844B040753BC048DEBFF0358B39FA15C39E7

12

6F3FF062C0A4CA13A12C68FB3FC17A12F75BD18BA6CB76CC82660F026A966990

13

ECA3A3666B0FD72028431431E7FAE6774A8CA692E35AE3CB44FD8F2AA418F746

14

05A64C76B56919F4C6063CE376B59AC84C707425D6A442936B5AD659F7293C1E

15

36D7471FA1E7C3AF4BE233F4F4971B41CF0A1EF1067D4C3B1D3BD4C3CD3D2E38

16

70F447054FD798F6EC3D6E67104F0910C73BAD80A94FD83AAC4F119786A0F253

17

545E1A911DA1071D79D9C40E945480FD9D5BA051472991819F8EB2644C5A6F3D

18

3E72CC3C0DB3513A29FF53E27726FB9277C7D2F13661CF0DFCA8EB34DC690074

19

FF2BEF8912CCD5CEE93DC8C6FB4BE2B142E790A30689AFEDB32ECB665AD1F040

20

BA84EB2885F01C15DFDA3FE394486BE9E7E0FAECE28EABA70B007BE5864C233D

21

42979D0E32550419DFA7F7BB1C5CCA245056E0EC50B489CA73C259E45C76C66D

22

969BCDB8DC4043483AB645AFFF4616A1845F2276EF4165475F6357D71508047C

New Quark Rules For SpyNote

New Quark rules (#238 - #242) are now available. These rules target SpyNote, a malware family that takes screenshots, simulates user gestures, logs user input, and communicates with C2 servers. Check here for the rule details.

With these rules, Quark is now able to identify the SpyNote malware family as high-risk. In our experiment, Quark achieved 100% accuracy and 100% precision. Please check here for the APKs we tested.

Below is a summary report of a SpyNote sample (0713a683567125ea6fdff233cfa850b36a0d2c7d7c964510405cbdf669fe2a8b). The report shows that Quark identified the sample as high-risk, with a list of behaviors as evidence.

Identified Well-Known Threats

With Quark’s rule classification feature, analysts can generate behavior maps and see how behaviors are related. This feature helps identify 4 well-known threats from SpyNote, as shown below.

1. Take screenshots

The behavior map shows that the Lcom/maintain/gybbpabtniopoetzeacrkmlxdhuvgpvnwtahmsaxmtnaltfrgf2/keydkuycdcczonreivsieapzgrzkejxcowwsziydpvouihgqnu3/AccessService function obtains screenshot data and converts it into bitmap format.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Extract screenshot data to bitmap format (#00238)

2. Simulate user gestures

The behavior map shows that the Lcom/maintain/gybbpabtniopoetzeacrkmlxdhuvgpvnwtahmsaxmtnaltfrgf2/Perfct;clickByGesture function simulates user finger gestures on a mobile phone.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Simulate user gestures (#00240)

3. Log user input

The behavior map shows that the Lcom/maintain/gybbpabtniopoetzeacrkmlxdhuvgpvnwtahmsaxmtnaltfrgf2/keydkuycdcczonreivsieapzgrzkejxcowwsziydpvouihgqnu3/AccessService;checkPassword function obtains the description of a UI element. It also calls the Lcom/maintain/gybbpabtniopoetzeacrkmlxdhuvgpvnwtahmsaxmtnaltfrgf2/FileUtils;writeText to log the data to a file. If the UI element is a keypad button on the lock screen, the user’s password can be logged.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Get the description of a UI element (#00241)

  • Write data to a file (#00242)

4. Communicate with C2 servers

The behavior map shows that the Lcom/maintain/gybbpabtniopoetzeacrkmlxdhuvgpvnwtahmsaxmtnaltfrgf2/hlshzietuthuztzpsjgswpikkmwdxkiqxbzdseqdoywzyerfhi4/CameraHandler$1;run function establishes a connection to an IP address, which could be a malicious C2 server.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Establish a connection to an IP address (#00239)

List of Tested APKs

The table below lists the APKs we tested.

index

sha256

1

059b5f74e053c2966775157cd521580fcfaa3b1a7613560b8f499dbd9c11d4b4

2

0713a683567125ea6fdff233cfa850b36a0d2c7d7c964510405cbdf669fe2a8b

3

4b2b411e03aafaa19ea93286fadd39a5134f4a039db2d5019b1054547c0d5601

4

5c01f7727c78dea9c89dccf92b01b4c45e69406e6462340779401497bf4d4589

5

8c365bd58edeb2ca371ead5e28350ee6c480a79f558d967ecbef525e9f1d7b3e

6

da4f59bdc91eaeaba238a8ba9602f7d5cc75f0892a92f5422e23b55accbbb2f0

7

dd7650a9cd3f853e109d2d0138ede785e1559d6c2d8c52eec2f2d9808a924f1c

8

dee1eaaa8879a7d321ef4e698203be7b23eeda80a6dea3c70cbf3138597b1800

9

f46b863952599b91a4d2d682a80f345dfa03fad473d1938f2c53a3139c87a019

10

eec5096dfca6824317863f9225c29f6c4b3442c48fefa62dc382e3569bca5a60

New Quark Rules For DawDropper

New Quark rules (#243 - #245) are now available. These rules target DawDropper, a malware family that downloads and installs additional APKs. Check here for the rule details.

With these rules, Quark is now able to identify the DawDropper malware family as high-risk. In our experiment, Quark achieved 100% accuracy and 100% precision. Please check here for the APKs we tested.

Below is a summary report of a DawDropper sample (a1298cc00605c79679f72b22d5c9c8e5c8557218458d6a6bd152b2c2514810eb). The report shows that Quark identified the sample as high-risk, with a list of behaviors as evidence.

Identified Well-Known Threats

With Quark’s rule classification feature, analysts can generate behavior maps and see how behaviors are related. This feature helps identify two well-known threats from DawDropper, as shown below.

1. Download APKs from remote servers

The behavior map shows that the Lcom/techmediapro/photoediting/core/MainActivity;N0 function downloads a file from a URL. If the URL points to an APK, it indicates that the function downloads an additional APK from a remote server.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Connect to a URL and read data from it (#00243)

  • Write data to a file (#00244)

2. Install additional APKs

The behavior map shows that the Lcom/techmediapro/photoediting/core/MainActivity;S0 function installs additional APKs.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Install other APKs from file (#00245)

List of Tested APKs

The table below lists the APKs we tested.

index

sha256

1

022a01566d6033f6d90ab182c4e69f80a3851565aaaa386c8fa1a9435cb55c91

2

02499a198a8be5e203b7929287115cc84d286fc6afdb1bc84f902e433a7961e4

3

05b3e4071f62763b3925fca9db383aeaad6183c690eecbbf532b080dfa6a5a08

4

71c44a78cd77a8f5767096f268c3193108ac06ff3779c65e78bc879d3b0ff11d

5

77f226769eb1a886606823d5b7832d92f678f0c2e1133f3bbee939b256c398aa

6

8fef8831cbc864ffe16e281b0e4af8e3999518c15677866ac80ffb9495959637

7

9b2064f8808d3aaa2d3dc9f5c7ee0775b29e29df3a958466a8953f148b702461

8

a1298cc00605c79679f72b22d5c9c8e5c8557218458d6a6bd152b2c2514810eb

9

b4bd13770c3514596dd36854850a9507e5734374083a0e4299c697b6c9b9ec58

10

d5ac8e081298e3b14b41f2134dae68535bcf740841e75f91754d3d0c0814ed42

New Quark Rules For SLocker

New Quark rule (#246) is now available. This rule targets SLocker, a malware family that locks the device with an overlay screen. Check here for the rule details.

With this rule, Quark is now able to identify the SLocker malware family as high-risk. In our experiment, Quark achieved 100% accuracy and 100% precision. Please check here for the APKs we tested.

Below is a summary report of a SLocker sample (570e2811e8c87f714eb3485c271ec03b9de699c6b7f67e858a24396ce5f7b69e). The report shows that Quark identified the sample as high-risk, with a list of behaviors as evidence.

Identified Well-Known Threats

With Quark’s rule classification feature, analysts can generate behavior maps and see how behaviors are related. This feature helps identify 1 well-known threat from SLocker, as shown below.

1. Lock the device with an overlay screen

The behavior map reveals that the Lcom/lololo/LockService;onCreate function creates an overlay window on top of other applications. By configuring the window to occupy the entire screen, the APK can block all user interactions and lock the device.

The behavior detected by Quark:

  • Create an overlay window on top of other applications (#00246)

List of Tested APKs

The table below lists the APKs we tested.

index

sha256

1

35c39da84abfc8d8b89389524d6e203d91e5af8004720c60f13b492e14ddde56

2

570e2811e8c87f714eb3485c271ec03b9de699c6b7f67e858a24396ce5f7b69e

3

88b86662dd1653845985544299fd8cc732f49c72d63c86ea3ffb7bb3b3249138

4

8ec195cd1f5c9f66c75000f26120832d7e1a9044fe3699d18d676bd5739b8518

5

9cc9fba099c35d65638f521e5a1d748ea432b64d82fe9732cfc52f8b57d3dffd

6

9e875f82515cc6b27367ae20ef52b9e0d7476bf8bda91e2ba0d888cf0857311f

7

a60082e481d6873103537e136b7b14a7892cd1205593d64567a448453eff4a6a

8

b5ab87692109c072cc277246e957ab32cfce6973f9f06c609ba51b53114cce51

9

df091031ed5073de09158b3afcf1fb956d1f337a66e552e9d3458ed5f5f6edb1

10

e504ff4501da2412758babadabb05a761ae6edacd043d68334e384d94fe4f4ac

11

f3fcd84b4e92a52ae5b30df003b911f21b2ea4325f788d5a5decc08582d3fd40

New Quark Rules For PhantomCard

New Quark rules (#247 - #251) are now available. These rules target PhantomCard, a malware family that communicates with C2 servers, reads the payment data of NFC cards, and captures PINs of NFC cards through deceptive screens. Check here for the rule details.

With these rules, Quark is now able to identify the PhantomCard malware family as high-risk. In our experiment, Quark achieved 100% accuracy and 100% precision. Please check here for the APKs we tested.

Below is a summary report of a PhantomCard sample (5769ae3cc93943dda4d1743f2febf6cec1282a0a6289da68cb55bb4724ec9332). The report shows that Quark identified the sample as high-risk, with a list of behaviors as evidence.

Identified Well-Known Threats

With Quark’s rule classification feature, analysts can generate behavior maps and see how behaviors are related. This feature helps identify 3 well-known threats from PhantomCard, as shown below.

1. Communicate with C2 servers

The behavior map reveals that the Ls1/j;doInBackground function establishes a connection to an IP address, which could be a malicious C2 server.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Establish a connection to an IP address (#00247)

2. Read the payment data of NFC cards

The behavior map reveals that the Lt1/c;b function establishes a connection to an NFC card and reads the payment data stored in it.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Establish a connection to an NFC card (#00248)

  • Read the payment data stored in an NFC card (#00249)

3. Captures PINs of NFC cards through deceptive screens

The behavior map reveals that the Le/r;onReceive function creates a UI layout and listens for user clicks on a UI element. If the UI layout is deceptive, users could be deceived into entering their NFC card PINs. Subsequently, the app could harvest the PINs by listening for user clicks on UI elements such as keypad buttons.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

  • Create a UI layout from XML (#00250)

  • Listen for user clicks on a UI element (#00251)

List of Tested APKs

The table below lists the APKs we tested.

index

sha256

1

0d5fd1997ecb76a167df753d5cce7688dfd0d813c028c9644025da352af77b7d

2

21c66fe505f2bcd7b29d413189920b3a85df48da0ecf4eb6962d6a504a7fdcd8

3

2922fcf373e2caf3588266cfafeaafbc74304c81d024315d279f0ea537adc1b6

4

360966ad8752d040e9aaae5cb4a5913e6f85edcf56ecfeb8246729b45d0e6c78

5

5769ae3cc93943dda4d1743f2febf6cec1282a0a6289da68cb55bb4724ec9332

6

a78ab0c38fc97406727e48f0eb5a803b1edb9da4a39e613f013b3c5b4736262f

7

ab2906d88e4f64ec0784ef8fdf132bb7ca9a914c037c3b731803f3adfd7a8f66

8

cb10953f39723427d697d06550fae2a330d7fff8fc42e034821e4a4c55f5a667

9

d3f863757e946d117ee7c7b50e480264a2ff1a08e7925bd2de3e6c43182868ed

10

e27579b92fcad2f4fe96db7b5e7a7cdc41754a7cd126fcaf598d3f8d8c21c0f5